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REPORT ON THE PROPOSED
FRASER-COLUMBIA WATER TRANSFER
Some Economic and Legal Implications
For the Upstream Riparians
I. A. McDOUGALL*
INTRODUCTION
At present Canada is faced with a mild international crisis concerning
the question of continental agreements for the sale of oil, gas, water
(possibly), and other energy sources. This is of course the so-called "Hickel
plan". Basically at issue is the support of the American industrial way of
life. Such primary resource sales by Canada may be fairly considered as
nothing more than a form of subsidy necessary for the continued tenure and
furtherance of the U.S. style of production and consumption. The decision to
commit so large a measure of the globe's untapped resources towards such a
use cannot be divorced from the larger question of environmental waste.
The ramifications of Canadian decision-making today will have broad impact
upon future forms of industrial development and environmental abuse. In
short, at issue is an "ethic of resource use".
Conservationists have alleged that in the period since 1945 the United
States has expended more of the world's non-renewable resources than has
been used by the rest of the world's population over the entire history of
mankind. This nation accounts for 6% of the world's population. It has,
however, produced 50% of the world's steel, consumed 50% of the global
oil reserves, and 90% of its natural gas. The advent of the age of "high mass
consumption" is rapidly depleting the domestic resource base and increasingly
making the economy dependent upon external sources of raw material. In
terms of its remaining natural endowments the United States is very close to
becoming a "have not" nation. Free access to Canadian raw materials is
thus a national imperative.
Of all forms of primary resource sales, water stands in a category all to
itself. The growing American water quandary is perhaps an eloquent example
of an enlarging disparity between domestic U.S. demand and supply.' Com-
pared with the total possible supply base of 650 billion gallons per day,
demand estimates for the year 2000 are 1,000 billion gallons per day. Of its
twenty-two water resource regions the U.S. expects to exploit five by 1980
or before, eight by the year 2000 and 17 in the foreseeable future should pol-
*1. A. McDougall, B.A., is a 3rd year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
Ip. 1, A Study of Pollution-Water, A Staff Report to the Committee on Public
Works, United States Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1963.
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lution preclusions continue unabated in what are now water-rich regions. 2 It
would appear that access to additional water supplies is more of a pre-
condition to the future economic development of the United States economy
than is true of any single other primary resource.
Perhaps for this reason Canada has experienced what amounts to direct
and overt foreign pressures brought to bear on domestic policy formation,
which have ultimately resulted in vast jurisdictional encroachments into
Canada. The most appropriate of examples to be found is in the recent inter-
national joint commission negotiations which led to the development of the
Columbia River Treaty. This agreement represented an almost complete
departure from the pre-existing rules of Canadian-American International
Trans-boundary Water Law and resulted in a severance of the Canadian
section of the Columbia River basin from effective Canadian sovereign
control. The overall economic impact of this result was profound in terms
of future Western Canadian hydro-electric development, future industrial
locations around power sources in the West, some existing Western primary
interests that would be denied access to cheaper power otherwise available,
Prairie irrigation sources, and possibly Prairie wheat prices and productivity
by way of preventing delivery of low cost Columbia-Kootenay irrigation
waters. More recent developments of international law insofar as development
of Canadian trans-boundary water rights are concerned have been far from
an outstanding success. Since the definitive statement in 1909 of upstream
riparian prerogatives laid out by Article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty,
the country has evidenced an alarming readiness to accede to new doctrines
which mitigate its effect. The case of the Columbia River Treaty has
proven this to be to the disadvantage of Canada and the concomitant
benefit of the U.S. Absent swift Canadian initiative to clarify the terms
of the Columbia River Treaty, Canada will have forfeited one of the most
important water resources of the nation and one of the world's most valuable
assets.
As matters stand the treaty offers two lessons. First it has demonstrated
that Canada faces a serious challenge with respect to its sovereignty
over Canadian water resources. Second, it has also showed the appalling cost of
Canada's failure to develop a nation-wide water resource policy to which all
provinces must adhere. The ambiguity of the treaty has permitted two views
of its significance to remain current. The first is to the effect that the treaty is
a precedent, affirms the view that North-American water resources are a
continental heritage to be allocated in favour of those in greatest need
(which is to say invariably the United States). The proponents of this view
understandably are usually American. The second interpretation contends that
the treaty has no precedent value, and that each nation has the right to
employ all waters occurring within its own territory in accordance with
national interest. This view in light of the treaty's provisions is a tenuous one.
It is of course in Canadian interests that it be confirmed. A small scale
project currently under study in British Columbia and by the Federal
department of Energy, Mines and Resources, presents a unique and perhaps
2 Senator Frank E. Moss, The Water Crisis, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1967.
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final opportunity to achieve the required clarification of the Columbia River
Treaty. It also affords opportunity for the development of a cross-Canada
policy on water resources vis-a-vis the growing demand for a water export
agreement from the United States.
The form of the following report consists of three basic sections. The
first outlines a background of the particular Shuswap Okanagan water transfer
proposal. Attention is directed to the foundations of the Okanagan's water
difficulties, and the assumptions lying behind the argument that an extra-basin
diversion into that region is necessary. Brief note has been made of conserva-
tion factors and alternative development schemes that to date have yet to be
considered in any formal sense. The first and second sections suggest the
current misinformation as to Okanagan water needs presents a very real risk
of an inadvertent international water flow increase in the event that the
proposed diversion scheme is realized. It is this possibility which invokes
issues of potentially far greater significance than the question of whether or not
the Okanagan valley should have more water.
Section two discusses in some detail the reasons for this. Recent
developments of international boundary water law are described, and the
current areas of legal uncertainty are considered. In particular this portion
focuses upon the Columbia Treaty precedent, and the impact which it had
upon the pre-existing rules of law with respect to source owner riparian rights.
The concluding section of the report suggests a development scheme
aimed primarily at resolving the current international uncertainty regarding a
rule of law applicable to trans-boundary waters. It is suggested, however, that
this recommendation is no more than the better of two possible alternatives.
These are that either diversion not take place at all, or that an expanded
diversion take place utilizing Columbia flow stored in Canada, and delivering
an amount deliberately in excess of the Okanagan's projected needs.
PROPOSED FRASER-COLUMBIA WATER TRANSFER:
BACKGROUND
"The input of water into the Okanagan lake system according to B.C.
Department of Water Resources figures is approximately 350,000 acre feet per year.
This is only just sufficient to meet current needs. It is not enough to provide any
extra water for anything, including the necessitous 'flushing' action that is a basic
part of draining the lakes of pollution. To this must be added the obvious
growth-factors of the area. Within 25 years, and possibly far less, the population
in the area could increase by 50% conservatively. Irrigation demands are also
on the upswing; gravity sources of supply are all spoken for. Thus if the
Okanagan is to continue to grow as it should more water supply must be found
somewhere." 3
Geographically, the Okanagan represents Canada's closest approximation
of a desert. Its soil is of the dark grassland variety, and the predominating
3 From the files of Mr. Bruce Howard, Member of Parliament for Okanagan-
Boundary. This is an excerpt from an address given by an un-named Okanagan resident
before the Vernon Chamber of Commerce.
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activities are fruit and tobacco agriculture, with some ranching in the northern
reaches of the valley. The area is the driest of Southern Canada, being a part
of the larger Fraser plateau region of British Columbia, which has a precipita-
tion range of between five and eighteen inches a year. The Okanagan summer
is Canada's warmest. Winters are also on the extreme, being quite severe but
brief. The valley floor lies at approximately 1120 feet and cultivation occurs
up to an altitude of approximately 1500 feet. The region is centrally located in
the larger interior plateau, representing a 2000 foot deep trench that extends
northwards from the forty-ninth parallel for roughly one hundred miles.
Of recent, Okanagan agriculturalists have been by and large unsuccessful.
There is no one definitive reason that can account for this, for a number of
forces have been at play, including unpredictably severe winter frosts in 1964
and 1968, small agrarian units pre-empting those economies of scale potential
to orcharding, loss of markets due to supply fluctuations, and generally hap-
hazard cultivation techniques. The result has been a continuous series of
crises for the regional economy and more than once the area has required
large scale federal relief.4
THE OKANAGAN WATER "PROBLEM"
In an effort to alleviate the burdens of this instability quite extensive
campaigns have been undertaken to attract light industry5 to the valley on a
joint basis between the Federal, Provincial and Municipal governments. Fur-
ther effort has also been devoted to the already extensive tourism facilities of
the lake region. Next to agriculture, this sector is the most vital element of the
regional economy. Yet it too has suffered a severe set-back in the form of a
pollution problem that has been given wide-spread publicity. During the
summer of 1968 Lake Skaha which is fed by Lake Okanagan and separated
from it by the town of Penticton was condemned due to an alarmingly high
rate of nutrient increases. Similar fears were expressed concerning the
larger Lake Okanagan as well, and subsequent biochemical oxygen demand
counts showed that it also was in some danger. The detrimental impact of the
publicity given to the reports upon the regional tourism industry was pro-
found, extending into the multi-million dollar category for the 1968 summer
alone according to some estimates.6
4 1965 marked the beginning of a large scale federal redevelopment programme
which continues to the date of writing.
5 In 1965 agricultural relief aimed particularly at the larger scale agriculturalists in
an obvious effort to enhance the trend to larger production units. The importance there-
fore of a rise in light manufacturing would appear to be to stimulate an employment
shift from marginal orcharding to industry, thereby leaving the marginal farming lands
available to more efficient producers. Towards this end, since the winter of 1965, a series
of advertisements have appeared in trading, financial and news periodicals offering large
tax concessions, depreciation allowances and low land prices to any manufacturing
activity willing to locate in the valley.
6The Kelowna and Penticton Chambers of Commerce.
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'This is, certainly, a mess of the Okanagan's own making. It is the Okan-
agan's own sewage, the effluent from the Okanagan's own wineries and other
light industries, which is feeding the algae. Yet a threat to the Okanagan is a
threat to all of B.C. It is all of the recreational waters of the Okanagan adversely
effects our $180 million tourist industry."7
The summed effect of the region's agricultural and tourism problems is
that the regional economy shows every promise of going from bad to worse,a
with sectorial depression of its two major industries in the offing. As a con-
sequence, a somewhat frantic search has been in progress to find a solution
to the regional plighf in both areas. To many, an obvious answer appears
to be more water and, in particular, a water export from the Fraser basin.
Superficially this proposal has some logic, for it is argued that an increase
in water supply will have a dual effect. On the one hand it will help
stabilize agricultural output, where once periodic water droughts threatened
it, and concurrently allow an ultimate expansion of irrigated land by 63,000
acres9; and on the other hand, ease the pollution threat by way of causing
the system to 'flush' at an accelerated rate. Unfortunately, a closer examina-
tion appears to suggest that both contentions are erroneous.
STUDY OVERSIGHTS
The proposal to increase the Okanagan water supply base was first
conceived during early researches by the British Columbia Lands, Forests and
Water Resources Department. Initially two supply sources were considered: 10
the Similkameen River which flows into the main arm Okanagan River
immediately south of the forty-ninth parallel, and the Shuswap River which
flows via the South Thompson into mainstream Fraser River. The first of these
possibilities was abandoned when it was learned that the Similkameen flows
had been largely committed in both Canada and the United States per
international agreement. Thus the Shuswap diversion was the sole proposal
given further attention. As to this prospective source two reports were
forthcoming. One of these was an engineering study prepared by the
province and sponsored under the auspices of the joint federal-provincial
Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Assistance Programme, which
was submitted to the province in August of 1966.11 A second report by the
7 p. 4 The Vancouver Sun, Monday, July 22nd, 1968, Editorial entitled 'Calling a
Spade a Spade'.8 Prior to the latest agrarian crises and the pollution-scare the area was technically
considered a 'depressed' region, based upon the high incidence of unemployment, wage
rates and per capita relief expenditures each year as opposed to the value of output.
9 Department of Energy Mines and Resources, Notes on Shuswap Diversion to
Okanagan River, undated.
10 The British Columbia Government had earlier wished to apply some of these
flows to a scheme known as the Cawston Benches Project and was only able to do
so in relation to the flood waters of May and June, and drawing from only that volume
stored over this time.
" ARDA (Research) Project No. 10031-August, 1966. Preliminary Report No. 1
Shusawp Lake Water Supply Canal. Water Investigations Branch, B.C. Water Resources
Service, Dept. of Lands and Forest and Water Resources.
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Provincial Department of Lands, Forests and Water Resources followed in
May of 1967.12 Neither report was prompted by an existing general water
shortage in the Okanagan or with reference to pollution abatement, for the
pollution was in fact a subsequent discovery. Rather both studies were with
the object of stimulating new industry for the valley in the form of large scale
grape and wine production.
"The provincial government is studying a way to turn thousands of acres of
Okanagan sagebrush into a sea of grapes. It has received a report from the water
resources branch outlining possibilities for creation of a water supply canal from
the Shuswap River to Okanagan Lake. The Canal would provide irrigation for
grape growing . . . Richter (Provincial Agriculture Minister) told the Sun that
under the proposed water supply system, the flow could be reversed to carry water
to whatever part of the area needed it. Storage to ensure a steady water supply
is available in Sugar and Mabel Lakes. He said, 'Our greatest need today is for
more land for grape growing. We are far short of our requirement now and
have to turn to California for much of the grape supply for our wineries.""13
The studies were limited and uncomprehensive and for that reason
generated considerable alarm from the Shuswap-Thompson population. For-
mer federal Justice Minister the Honourable Davie Fulton was moved to note
that:
"At no point does (the study) suggest let alone undertake, an examination
of the results of such a diversion on the flows of the Thompson River System, its
possible effects on fisheries, the requirements of that system for irrigation and
industrial purposes; nor does it even glance at the possibility of alternative supplies
for the Okanagan; nor again does it make any comparison or effort to measure
the advantages and disadvantages to the one system against advantages and
disadvantages actual or potential to the other.
In short, it does not seem to me to qualify as a study at all; it is rather
simply a physical feasibility analysis and a very limited one at that."14
One of the more significant failings of the ARDA report was that it pre-
sumed that there was a measurable deficiency of water supply in prospect
for the Okanagan, and made its recommendations for the project on this
basis. This argument in turn rested upon the assumption made by the study
that the current population of 72,000 would climb, over a 60 year span, to
261,00015 persons. When the contemporary economic outlook for the region
vis-a-vis agriculture and tourism is considered, this population projection
becomes a highly questionable one. The 164,000 acre feet (hereafter
referred to as AF) 16 that is currently drawn off for agrarian uses was
estimated to reach a demand total of 573,000 AF 1 by the year 2000. Based
12ARDA (Research) Project No. 10031-May, 1967. Preliminary Report No.
10041 Effect of Shuswap River-Okanagan Lake Water Supply Canal Operation Scheme 3,
alternatives 2 and 3 in the Shuswap and South Thompson Rivers, ilD.
13 Scheme for Okanagan; Sagebrush to Sea of Grapes, The Vancouver Sun, Feb-
ruary 1967.
i4 Extracts of a letter from Mr. Fulton to the Hon. Maurice Sauve, Federal
Minister of Forestry and Rural Development, as cited by the Kamloops Daily Sentinel,
February 2, 1968.
1510 17 15 The study has not yet been released by the province. The quoted figures
were obtained from notes taken by Dr. T. O'Riordan, Department of Geography, Simon
Fraser University, who has had access to the report.
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upon these same population estimates, this is approximately 213,000 AF per
annum in excess of the mean recorded inflow, and a scant 57,000 AF below
the all-time high recorded inflow. Thus the study recommended that a
minimum of 285,000 AF 19 per annum be. diverted from the Shuswap to
augment pre-existing Okanagan supplies.
This recommendation is an unrealistic one. In the first place, if the
population growth estimates are themselves wrong, so too will the demand
projections necessarily be in error. In the second place, it was assumed that
the standard water consumer of the year 2000 would employ the same
parochial irrigation methods20 as currently prevail. Additionally the study
assumed that fifty percent of that water applied to agriculture returned
to the system in the same channel from which is was drawn, and calculated
demand growth on this basis. This has been cited2l as a rather generous
proportion to attribute to agrarian consumption and it has been suggested that
the actual return to the system is considerably greater.22 To the extent that
this is the case, agricultural demand has again been exaggerated.
The most important error source inherent in the study's assumptions,
for the purposes of this paper, result from its failure to appreciate level
regulation problems currently being encountered on Lake Okanagan. There is
presently only five feet of installed head control at Penticton, Lake Okanagan's
outlet. Of this, four feet are useable with the incremental foot for flood
emergencies only. Lake Okanagan's surface area is 84,000 acres, which
implies that the normal maximum potential storage on the lake can be as
high as 336,000 AF, and the emergency maximum 420,000 AF. These
volumes represent two and three times the current irrigation demand levies
per year, with enough to leave a 100,000 to 184,000 AF surplus when
urban and industrial water demands are subtracted. 23
THE ACTUAL OKANAGAN WATER PROBLEM
In spite of these apparent surpluses, the Okanagan periodically complains
of drought conditions which are in fact very real. This occurs for several
reasons. First, the extent to which Lake Okanagan can be used as a source
of hold-over storage during years of excessive run-off as insurance against
drought years that may follow is limited by other factors. Chief among these
is the fact that much of the lakeshore is heavily developed for the tourist
19 285,000 acre feet at a constant flow produces power equal to 2,000,000 kilowatt
hours per annum approximately.
20 Examples of this might be irrigation taking place during the heat of day, irriga-
tion water applied at random, disproportionate water losses in the irrigation sluices and
pipings, and minimal soil and vegetation preparation to make best use of irrigation
application. All of the above are the case today.
21 op. cit. supra notes 11.
22 By dealing solely with direct returns to the system the study ignored the fact
that considerable amounts reach the lake via percolation and ground water sources.
23 The total present demand (Dto) is 236,000 AF all-inclusive according to the
ARDA report. Supra notes 11 and 12.
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industry, and thus the lakeshore properties are of considerable value to both
their owners and to the region at large; it is necessary therefore that level
fluctuations be minimal. Secondly, the water inflows have proven to be
difficult to forecast on a year to year and season to season basis owing
partially to the fact that the system is fed from mountain snow packs. And
thirdly, for this same reason, short-range storage control is very limited and
frequently wasteful.
"The seriousness of water shortage may be of minor significance when
Okanagan lake inflow approaches the minimum water requirement and when
some carry over storage on the Okanagan lake is available. However when annual
inflow is only half of the minimum water requirement such as occurred in 1926
and when there is a repetition of limited run-off over a three year period such as
occurred in 1929 to 1932, the water supply conditions would be serious. In
addition it is very difficult to accurately forecast the Okanagan lake inflow and
therefore the Okanagan lake storage cannot be operated without a certain
waste."24, 25
These factors in conjunction with agrarian, urban and industrial water
waste have produced genuine periodic water supply deficits. Yet it is abund-
antly clear that yearly absolute deficiencies of supply are a rarity, and assuming
that more storage supply could be provided, and regulation control improved,
they could be eliminated altogether. Both of these difficulties are potentially
solvable under one programme of development. Regulation is made difficult
because inflows are both unpredictable and uncontrolled. Storage is made
difficult because of the necessity to minimize lake level variations. Large
scale development of inflow route storages would greatly improve both
supply information, and thus regulation timing, and concurrently limit
reliance upon Lake Okanagan for holdover storage. Further, as inflow
storage would be at high altitudes, it could be brought to the agrarians with
less cost26 for it would eliminate, in some cases, the need to pump from the
lake.
On the demand side, the problem is one of exaggerated need estimates
and is less easily corrected. Yet before a water import can be entertained in
a formal sense, the question should be approached, for current estimates have
placed the agrarian waste factor alone at twenty-five per cent.27 Water
charges, irrigation controls (e.g. municipal by-law restrictions), fertilization
programmes, vegetation controls would all be of aid, but the current
predominance of small scale, marginally productive units, operating under
parochial methods of cultivation imposes rather severe limitations upon most
improvement measures.
24 The Penticton Herald, Tuesday, April 16, 1968. The emphasis is my own.
25 A fourth factor which limits supply, particularly when storage release errors
have been made, is the flow requirement prescribed by the Federal Department of
Fisheries for the Okanagan River during spawning seasons.26 This is in an economic sense only for as matters stand many do not have to pay
a water rate, and in instances where charges are levied, they do not reflect costs.
27 op. cit. supra note 15.
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Thus on the quantative22 side of the Okanagan water controversy there
are essentially three elements. These are, in summary, a widespread belief
that an augmenting of the area's water supply will do much towards solving
its economic difficulties; that current water conservation practices by agricul-
ture particularly are wasteful; and that there exists a lack of supply information
which has created inefficient storage control, which has in turn aggravated,
if not occasionally created, water scarcities and its attendant difficulties for
the region.
DIVERSION AND THE PROPERTY RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS: PRE AND POST COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY
Due to the fact that current Okanagan flow regulation is inefficient, each
year water that might be applied to Okanagan needs flows out of the system
and into the mainstem Columbia. The variations of such flows depends
upon three variables: the amount of run-off each year, the extent to which
this rate of inflow is anticipated and thus at least partially controlled, and
the total amount each year that must be released to maintain suitable lake
levels for the tourist industry in Lake Okanagan, as well as that volume
necessary to appease the federal department of fisheries flow requirements.
Thus, within upper and lower limits, a proportion of total inflow will neces-
sarily leave the jurisdiction and cross into the United States when needed by
Canada. During years of high run-off a greater volume will be thus disposed
than during years of low run-off.
In a similar fashion, if the base of supply is expanded, this also will
cause the total annual flow volume across the national frontier to rise. A
net flow increase on the Okanagan River is inevitable. Note has already
been made of the fact that Okanagan regulation is by no means perfected.
For the reasons that this is the case today, demands will be made upon water
from the external source of supply (i.e., the Shuswap) when it is not needed.29
28 On the qualitative side of the problem little can be said by virtue of the fact
that little is known regarding possible correctives. However a number of factors are
clear; namely that municipal and industrial wastage is by and large at fault, and that
control methods are inadequate vis a vis the problem of sewage and industrial waste
inflows. Whether or not water from another basin can be used to 'flush' the Okanagan
system must remain a moot point barring further research. A priori there would
appear to be little hope that it offers great cause for optimism. Organic waste must
first be controlled before the subsidiary question of flow increments can be approached.
Thus detailed considerations must be given to the potential ecological and climatic
effects of adding water of a substantially colder temperature to the Okanagan. Preliminary
Soviet and Canadian researches suggest these are substantial (re: paper by R. C.
Kollinger and others, Second International Oceanographic Congress in Moscow, June
1966).2 9 For example, suppose that run-off during a month is deficient and Shuswap
water is thus called upon to augment available supply, following which a high
pressure ridge accelerates snow pack run-off (i.e.: this occurs frequently). Given the
limited amount of storage possible on Lake Okanagan a greater amount of water will
have to be released than would have been necessary without Shuswap water access.
Annual Okanagan inflow into the mainstem Columbia will necessarily rise above the
natural volume.
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A necessary corollary of this will be that an amount of water greater than
would have been the case without the Shuswap water import will flow into
the mainstem of the Columbia.30
The confluence of the Okanagan 3l and the Columbia Rivers is slightly
downstream of the U.S. Columbia development of Chief Joseph, near the town
of Brewster, in Washington State. From Chief Joseph to the river's mouth at
Astoria, Oregon, the entire river's head is almost fully32 developed for hydro-
electric power. Thus, regardless of how diminutive the incremental inflows
that result from the Shuswap-Okanagan diversion are, their effect will create
a perceptible benefit to the United States power producers. Once perceived
they will, it is suggested, form the basis of two property claims by the United
States. These are, firstly, because the inflows represent a hydroelectric and
perhaps consumptive benefit, their occurrence becomes a matter of right. The
basis for this contention is known as the "doctrine of prior appropriation"
which is currently a crucial area of Canadian-American boundary water law.
33
Secondly, the United States may also claim that, as the water inflow derives
from what is now a purely national basin (i.e., the Fraser), once delivery
takes place the basin as a whole comes under international legal authority
in order that American interests can be protected.3 4 Both potential assertions
pose serious questions that must be considered before the contemplated
diversion can proceed. This may entail considerable delay and for that
reason a number of the diversion's proponents are dangerously adamant that
no such problem in fact exists.
"This business about diverting water from this area to the U.S. is just
propaganda from those who object to the Shuswap to Okanagan diversion. There
is no suggestion from any government source,3 5 or so far as I know from any
source in Canada that we should divert water from or through the Okanagan to
the U.S."36
Even were the above to be the case, this does not make it clear that a
property right will not pass by way of an inadvertent water transfer. In actual
fact the body of legal principles that emerged from the 1964 Columbia River
Treaty and Protocol strongly suggests that this WiU occur, for they earmarked
a quite radical departure from previously adhered to boundary water law
between Canada and the U.S.
30 This will occur in two manners. The lowest extremes of recorded outflow will
be moderated; water supplies will increase by virtue of the import during dry years;
the highest extreme of recorded outflow will rise coincident with misestimated water
requirements and poorly timed Shuswap inflows.
3' This is the American spelling which applies to their section of the river.
32 From Grand Coulee to the sea 1211 ft. (out of 1280 ft.) is developed, leaving
75 ft. (approx.) remain undeveloped. The drop from Chief Joseph to the sea is 699
ft. which therefore implies one ft. develops 700 kwh (enough to service a well-equipped
house for 1 month).
33 The doctrine's history and significance are discussed below.34 This assertion will not be an entirely novel one. A number of American
references have been made with respect to protection of their equity interests in any
Canadian Fraser development vis a vis the salmon fisheries.
-3 This is in error. An official of the Pacific Policy and Planning division of the
federal department of Energy, Mines and Resources told this researcher that a deliberate
and increased water export would be considered in current studies undertaken by his
staff.
36 Correspondence of Mr. Harley Hatfield, P.Eng., Penticton 16 February, 1969.
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THE HARMON DOCTRINE
The foundation of Canadian-American international law as to water
derived from the 1895 American-Mexican dispute over the use of the Rio
Grande. This case involved a Mexican claim that the Rio Grande inflows were
both reduced in volume and quality as a consequence of upstream develop-
ment by the American source owners. In reply, the United States asserted
what is now referred to as the Harmon Doctrine.3 7
"There is no duty or obligation in international law or any state to restrain
its use of the waters within its territory to accommodate the needs of another
state. Jurisdiction and control of a state over the waters of an international river
wholly in its territory is exclusive. The recognition of any other principle would
be entirely inconsistent with the sovereignty of a state over its national domain."3 8
This same principle was asserted in a Canadian reference regarding the
diversion of the Allagash River (a tributary of the St. John) prior to the 1909.
Boundary Waters Treaty, with Canada reluctantly acquiescing to it.39 When
the above Treaty Agreement was later completed, this same principle was
preserved. The relevant provision was its second article.
"Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the several
State governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provincial governments
on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty provisions now existing
with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and
diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the
line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into
boundary waters; but it is agreed that an interference with or diversion from their
natural channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any
injury on the other side of the boundary shall give rise to the same rights and
entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place
in the country where such diversion or interference occurs; but this provision shall
not apply to cases already existing or to cases expressly covered by special agree-
ment between the parties hereto."40
ARTICLE II was a less stringent version of the Harmon Doctrine when
compared with that asserted in the Rio Grande reference, to the extent that the
injured entity was given a cause of action before the injuring nation's courts,
in the same status as a national of that jurisdiction. But insofar as Canada
was concerned vis-a-vis the 1909 context, it was a somewhat illusory remedy.
By virtue of her want of development, any claim that she was able to assert
was unlikely to be so large as to have much impact upon U.S. decision-
making. The American attitude on the other hand was perhaps understand-
able. Both of her neighbours, Canada and Mexico, were less industrialized than
herself, and for that reason less likely to make prior use of those boundary
waters at issue. To allow either Canada or the Mexicans to assert riparian
rights per the common law would hamper the U.S. industrial development,
for the riparian doctrine afforded protection to users without regard to their
3 So named after the then U.S. Attorney General, Judson Harmon.
8 Austin Jacob, Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting The
International Law of International Rivers: A Study of the History and Influence of
the Harmon Doctrine, 37 Canadian Bar Review 393 at p. 405 (1959).
The emphasis is my own.
39 p. 43 Boundary Water Problems: Canada and the United States, Bloomfield and
Fitzgerald Carswell, Toronto, 1958.
40 p. 43, 44 ibid.
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relative needs. It gave the economically efficient and inefficient user the same
right to beneficial use without regard to the quantum of respective benefits
taken.
"Every riparian owner may divert the water of a stream for purposes in
connection with his land, or for other purposes, but he is bound to return the
water which he has diverted into the stream again before it leaves his land sub-
stantially undiminished in volume and unaltered in character; for a lower riparian
owner, subject to the rights of an upper owner, is entitled to have the water
flowing in the natural bed of the stream come to him unaltered in quality and
quantity, and come to his land in its ordinary and accustomed channel."
41
While the doctrine may have been suitable in early agricultural econo-
mies, where land was the principal source of wealth, it was less well suited to
modem integrated industrialized economies (which had developed generalized
productivity standards). In the latter, property was ideally vested in the
market's highest bidder on the assumption that the enterprise which could
pay the most was also the most efficient resource user (i.e., the most
productive). In theory, the riparian doctrine impeded the 'free operation of
the market'. Thus one finds that most common law jurisdictions have by
statute abandoned the common law riparian principles. In British Columbia's
case it was effected by way of the B.C. Water Act'2 which sets forth a
schedule of allocation priorities amongst various user groups.
CANADA AND THE RIPARIAN DOCTRINE
It was for the very fact that the riparian doctrine offered protection to
the user rights of the less efficient economic users, that Canada pressed for its
retention on an international level. Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier's
remarks to the House of Commons after the signature of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 were revealing on this point when he said:
" . . . the same principle should prevail in international law as prevails in
the common law and the civil laws, namely that a man may make such use of the
water that flows over his property so long as he does not do so to the detriment
of anybody else . . . but in this case, whether we like it or did not like it, the
United States has taken the position that international law provides that except
in waters of navigation, the upper power has the right to use the water within its
own territory as it thinks best. What were we to do?" 43
Judson Harmon, on the other hand, had clearly recognized the
implications of the argument put forth by Canada some fourteen years
previously:
... what is really contended for is a servitude which makes the lower
country dominate and subjects the upper country to the burden of arresting its
development and denying its inhabitants the use of a provision which nature has
supplied entirely within its own territory. . . in my opinion, the rules, principles,
and precedents of international law impose no liability upon the United States."44
41 p. 559, Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume 33, Butterworth and
Co. London, 1939.
42 B.C. Water Act R.S. 1948 c. 361.
43pp. 911-912, House of Commons Debates, Session 1910-1911, Volume 1.
44 p. 43 Supra Note 32.
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Thus both the antecedent Harmon Doctrine and its Treaty embodiment,
ARTICLE II, had at root the principle that national interests should transcend
the international. While the latter may have made some allowance for damage
compensation, 45 it nonetheless clearly asserted the fact that the source owner
of boundary waters was in no sense under an obligation to maintain the
quality or quantity of flow for the downstream land owners. If, as some
argue, ARTICLE II still applied there would be no issue regarding the Shuswap-
Okanagan transfer. 46 Regardless of the fact that increased flows might confer
benefit upon the United States, Canada could at any time assert an apparent
sovereign right under ARTICLE II to redirect all, or part of, the Shuswap
flows back within their natural channel (i.e., the Thompson and Fraser).4
Unfortunately, recent developments rob such an argument of much of its
force.
THE COLUMBIA RIVER
A review of International Joint Commission references which was
established and empowered by (Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and
Appendix 2 of) the Boundary Waters Treaty appears to affirm the view that
ARTICLE II remained in force until the Columbia River negotiations. At
this juncture U.S. interest appeared to wane in its principle. Here was a
case where Canadian and American positions were reversed from that which
hitherto had been the normal. The headwaters of both the Columbia and
Kootenay Rivers lay within Canadian territory, and now it was large scale
Canadian development which was at issue. The United States had two vital
interests to assert; namely in the development sequence contemplated by
Canada and the rapidity with which it could be completed. This last point
was compounded by the fact that head on the U.S. reaches of the Columbia
were approaching full development, and yet, due to the lack of adequate
storage, two thirds of the annual spring flow of 120 million acre feet (here-
after referred to as MAF) spilled uselessly over the top of the American
structures each spring.48 With depleting power reserves, and growing consump-
tive demands for water, it was essential that additional storage facilities be
completed. It was also apparent that development of such structures would
have to be within Canada. The cost of making the necessary reservoirs
wholly within the U.S. promised to be exorbitant and would involve inunda-
45 See External Affairs Committee Hearings, The Columbia River Treaty, Depart-
ment of External Affairs, April 1964, Volumes 1 to 20.
46 p. 25 Armstrong et al., The Columbia River Dispute, Osgoode Hall Law Journal,
Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1958.
47 For that matter if Article II obtained Canada need not even consider diversion
of Shuswap River flows for in the alternative she might then be able to tap either the
Similkameen or the upper Arrow Lake of the Canadian Section of the Columbia. A
tributary of the Upper Arrow is within five miles of the Shuswap River headwaters
in fact.
48 James G. Ripley, The Engineering and Contract Record, The Columbia River
Scandal, April 1964, p. 34.
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tion of large tracts of relatively valuable real estate. The U.S. second concern
with the sequence of development had to do with the issue of control.49 This
problem rested upon both the type of projectsO undertaken by Canada and
the timing of project development decided upon.
THE COLUMBIA PROPOSALS
The joint Canadian-American International Columbia River Engineering
Board, a sub-body of the International Joint Commission, in a 1959 report5'
advanced three alternative schemes of development in Canada regarding the
Columbia and Kootenay (see profile inserts). Of these, one appeared particu-
larly attractive to both parties. Known as the Dorr Diversion, or ICREB
Sequence IX A (see diagrams headed "Canada Plan"), this scheme contem-
plated the diversion of the southern flowing Kootenay headwaters across a
half mile strip of land known as Canal Flats and into the northern flowing
Columbia which would in turn be dammed. This offered a number of obvious
advantages. In the first case, hydroelectric energy is a function of the
volume of available water and the altitude at which it can be stored. The Doff,
Bull River, Luxor sequence maximized the storage potentials of both rivers
and retained it at the highest altitude possible. In the second case, the ICREB
studies clearly indicated that the optimal power development site 52 for
Canada lay downstream from the Dorr, Bull River, Luxor reservoir, near the
point where the Columbia veers to the south, slightly below the Canoe
River confluence point. Known as Mica Creek, this site was the virtual
'key' from which Canada had to approach development. Once Mica
was constructed and machined it was apparent that the bulk of the storage
of both the Columbia and Kootenay would be operated to suit its power
requirements. As this posed a difficulty to the U.S. downstream plants, Canada
proposed the construction of a small storage structure downstream from Mica
known as Murphy Creek. This would allow a holdover of Mica releases until
such time as the U.S. plants required the storage and thus would eliminate the
threat that Mica's development posed to the U.S. interests, by preserving the
ability to time storage releases (see map and river profile headed "Canada
Plan").
49 This was estimated at between $700,000,000 and $1,000,000,000 in the event
that Canadian co-operation was not achieved. p. 34, James G. Ripley, The Columbia
River Treaty, Engineering and Contract Record, September 1962.
50 A storage project for example would time its releases for downstream users.
A large scale hydroelectric plant on the other hand would time its releases per the
demands for power, potentially causing a conflict between upstream and downstream
power plant operations. See Plate 4, 61BB, Report of July 1961 to British Columbia
Energy Board, Sir Alexander Gibb, Mertz & McClelland.
51 The Report of the International Columbia River Engineering Board's research
has been summarized in The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol; A Presentation, Dept.
of External Affairs and Northern Affairs and National Resources, Queen's Printer,
Ottawa, February 1969.
52 This was due to a combination of altitude, valley conditions and bed rock levels.
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Sequence IX A offered a number of advantages to the U.S. once Murphy
Creek was included in the development schedule. On the one hand it enabled
the maximum increase in output through the reduction of spill.53 In
addition it presented the opportunity to increase capacity by way of the
expansion of existing facilities such as Grand Coulee, with a minimum of
capital expenditure being necessary.54 The selection of the Dorr Diversion
in precedence, to the other alternatives, meant that the US. would have to
forego its planned Libby Power Development on the U.S. Kootenay55
reaches, but this was without consequence so, long as the output total by way
of diversion was comparable and available at a lower per unit cost.
The marginal advantage obtained despite the fact that a proportion of
the increased power made possible in the U.S. would have to be shared with
Canada. The latter had argued that, because it was Canadian resources that
were being devoted to realizing the structures, and because Canadian territory
was being flooded, the U.S. downstream benefits (occurring at the U.S.
generating plants) could be solely attributed to Canadian effort and should be
therefore shared on a fifty-fifty basis. At first American reaction was strongly
opposed to this assertion. It was the U.S. opinion that expanding Canadian
power requirements made it inevitable that the Columbia River development
would shortly take place in Canada. However, two factors eroded this
reasoning. The British Columbia government was showing increased interest
in the more northerly Peace River Power development; a power source which
prima facie could be a subtitute for the Columbia development and thus make
it unnecessary for Canada to harness the latter for a long time into the
future. In addition Canada had under contemplation two collateral diversion
projects that complemented the Dorr, Bull River, Luxor reservoir. One of
these involved the rerouting of 15 MAF of Columbia water by way of the
South Thompson to the Fraser River for the purposes of large scale hydro-
electric development. The other contemplated a 6,000 cubic feet per second
diversion out of the reservoir at Surprise Rapids to the North Saskatchewan
River and thence the western prairies. The purpose of this was to augment
the prairie water supplies and preliminary benefit forecasts for that region
were staggering. By way of a combined consumptive delivery hydroelectric
scheme, on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains, it was estimated that
water from the Columbia could be introduced into the North Saskatchewan
River at a cost of seven dollars per acre foot.56 Water in the average Canadian
prairie town has been estimated to have a value of $150 per AF.57 Thus
assuming constant price, the market value alone of this water to solely the
53 This was by virtue of the fact that diversion brought the Kootenay headwaters
into the Columbia at a higher elevation than is otherwise the case.
54 This owed simply to the fact that the required capital investment was in mach-
inery and structure modification as opposed to incorporating turbines within a new
structure.
55 This is the American spelling applying to their section of the river.
56 Submission to the House of Commons Standing Committee of External Affairs by
the Government of Saskatchewan on the Columbia River Treaty, Regina, Saskatchewan,
May 8th, 1964.
5 7 James G. Ripley, The Columbia River Scandal, Engineering and Contract Record,
April 1964.
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agricultural sector, would be valued at $651,600,000 per annum. In addition,
a portion of this water could well be applied to the leaching of Saskatchewan's
enormous phosphate reserves.
DOCTRINE OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION VS. ARTICLE II
The threatening prospect of both diversions made it apparent to the
United States that Columbia development, without an extra basin transfer,
would have to afford an equal economic advantage to Canada, for, by virtue
of ARTICLE It, the Canadian right to divert, from the Columbia at least, was
not challengeable. However an attempt could be, and was, made with respect
to the Kootenay. At this juncture the Canadian and American teams were in
tacit agreement that no diversion should take place that interfered with
existing U.S. or Canadian developments. In other words, the two entities
recognized the principle that existing plants constituted an appropriation of
flows which the upstream power should not reduce. Thus, so far as the
Columbia was concerned, Canada could seemingly divert only those flows
not already committed to U.S. enjoyment.58 So far as the Kootenay was
concerned Canada's exercise of the right to divert, by virtue of the want of
development on the American section, was without a constraint. To combat
this the U.S. section (of the joint commission) alleged 9 that the doctrine of
prior appropriation extended to projects "under contemplation" as well as
those realized. Thus they contended that plans to construct the Libby Project
amounted to an appropriation 60 of Kootenay flows, curtailing Canada's right
under ARTICLE II to divert across the divide to the prairies. The Canadian
section rejected this argument as sophistry, knowing that to allow for it
would be to pave the way for similar 'first in time first in right' claims regard-
ing planned expansion on the U.S. Columbia reaches.61 Thus Canada would
neither be able to divert to the Thompson headwaters.
Given that Canada had been thus far successful in partially establishing
her rights under ARTICLE H with respect to both rivers, it was clear that
every inducement would have to be offered to dissuade Canada from making
extra basin water transfers; one of these being a concession to the Canadian
demand for an equal sharing of downstream benefits. Yet, while the right to
divert was beyond dispute with reference to the Columbia basin (at least
at this juncture) it did not amount to an unequivocal re-assertion of ARTICLE
II. It related solely to those flows uncommitted to downstream uses. Thus
58 The great wastage each spring implies that this right was tantamount to the
right to divert in toto (waters of Canadian origin are equal to roughly 33.5 MAF over
the spring period).
69 l.I.C. Docket 51.
60 This claim was in complete opposition to the earlier Waneta Order Reservation
insisted upon by the U.S.
61 To paraphrase the remarks of Gen. the Hon. A. G. L. McNaughton who was
chairman of the Canadian section of the LJ.C. at the time. It is perhaps notable
however that this rejection amounted to tacit recognition of the doctrine of prior
appropriation respecting existing developments.
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the Canadian stance really had no bearing upon other boundary waters
where diversion would result in a preemption of a benefit already taken from
the resource by the down-current state. The very fact that Canada did not
dispute the doctrine of prior appropriation vis-a-vis already established down-
stream projects to some extent legitimizes an argument that the absolute right
to divert under ARTICLE II was recognized by Canada as no longer applying.
Thus with reference to any flow increments arising from the instant
Shuswap-Okanagan proposal, Canada cannot safely rely on ARTICLE H's
provision regarding Canadian prerogatives as upstream owner of the resource
in question. Quite to the contrary, the opposing doctrine of prior appropriation
implies that any right Canada may have had under cover of ARTICLE II to
close off the Shuswap diversion, after it has once begun, has been abrogated.
The diversion as proposed may thus pass a property right of beneficial use
which will remain beyond recovery for all time.
THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL DISPUTE
The above suggestion is further underscored by developments that
followed U.S. recognition of Canada's right to a share of the downstream
benefits and culminating in the finalized Treaty Protocol in 1964, for while
Canada might have established the right to divert in and from the basin, she
did neither (see diagrams headed "Treaty Plan"). While there was ostensibly
international agreement that the Dorr, Bull River, Luxor Sequence IX A could
proceed, Canada was beset with internal disagreement. The British Columbia
government's involvement with the Peace River hydroelectric scheme had
seemingly caused it to greatly over extend its financial commitments. 62
Already the issue had created political scandal,63 and to the province it was
essential that development proceed with a minimum of hindrance. The Colum-
bia showed promise as a means of expediting this objective. Americans
wanted power and to get it seemed willing to pay for both upstream storage
and for the Canadian downstream benefit share. British Columbia for its
own part needed the capital and, at the same time, did not want the power
market flooded with electric energy that threatened pre-emption of the more
62The actual extent that this was the case will forever remain somewhat of a
mystery for the B.C. budget accounts are of a rather unorthodox form. They always
show a surplus. One of the means by which this is done is to enter highways, bridges,
power developments, and other public investments as contingent liabilities.
63 The Peace Project, known then as Portage Mountain Dam was twice the distance
from the Lower Mainland than was Mica (i.e.: the major load centre). Its locational
authority upon regional economic growth was doubtful. As transmission is the most
expensive element to power production its stimulant effect upon Lower Mainland
growth was also highly speculative. As a consequence the then privately owned market-
ing company, British Columbia Electric Co., refused to take on the Peace power,
instead pressing for maximum development of the nearer and less expensive Mica
Creek power. In face of this the Social Credit government expropriated the B.C.E. in
order that the Peace River project might proceed. Once the marketing vehicle had
been established by way of the expropriation, B.C.'s sole concern regarding the Columbia
was to some how turn it into a source of capital, with hopefully as little power being
produced as possible.
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expensive Peace River generation. For these reasons the province reached a
stance in the negotiations diametrically opposed to that of the Federal
government.
THE COLUMBIA GIVEAWAY
While (unfortunately) it is not relevant to this paper's scope to
chronologize the political history of the final resolution of the British
Columbia-Canada dispute, it is noteworthy to consider the terms of the
Treaty outcome. The sequence adopted was known numerically as VII. By
it no diversion was to be made of the Kootenay headwaters. The U.S.
was given the option to construct the Libby Project on their section, and
thereby create a reservoir which would flood forty-two miles into the Canadian
Kootenay Valley. 64 The major Columbia storage was to be situated down-
stream from the Mica site in the Arrow Lake region. The structure known
as High Arrow was to flood the Arrow Valley to an elevation of 1444 feet, and
was not capable of being machined. Mica itself, now that it was deprived of
most of its upstream storage control, was no longer so 'attractive' as a power
source. Thus today the prospect of its being machined has been referred to
as but a mere possibility. At any event, the power that it would be capable of
producing would be relatively expensive. A third storage structure known
as Duncan Lake was to be constructed on the Kootenay Lake northern inflow.
In addition, it was agreed that Canada should give up the right to divert for
power out of the basin per Treaty Article XIII, Section 1.
"Except as provided in this article neither Canada nor the United States
of America shall, without the consent of the other evidenced by an exchange
of notes, divert for any use, other than a consumptive use, any water from its
natural channel in a way that alters the flow of any water as it crosses the
Canada-United States of America boundary within the Columbia River basin." 65
This ended the prospect for a Columbia-Fraser diversion.66 It also
eliminated the Surprise Rapids prairie diversion for while a combined con-
64Under sequence IX A a greater total area (91,000 acres) would have been
inundated in the Kootenay Valley. But it is noteworthy that that land value vis a vis
agriculture increases progressively, beginning at the point where it is useless, as one
moves to the south. Thus the U.S. project submerges a greater value than would the
Dorr, Bull River, Luxor reservoir. Of the 91,000 acres to be inundated, 24,000 are
arable but require extensive reclamation. 2,500 acres is worked at present by some 40
principals. 25,000 could be reclaimed via swamp drainage but the Dorr, Bull River,
Luxor reservoir would make some 300,000 acres available on the benchlands per a
Prairie Farming Rehabilitation Association June 4, 1960 Report by S. C. Barry.65 Article XIII Section 1, Treaty Between Canada and the United States of America
Relating to Cooperative Development of the water resources of the Columbia River
Basin, 17 Jan. 61. Refer to art. I, s.s. 1, para e, as regards the treaty definition of
consumptive use.
66 A rather heated debate had arisen from the proposal respecting the possibility
of harm resulting to the Salmon industry. Unfortunately this aspect was polemicized
out of proportion and in a political sense B.C. was not unhappy about dropping the
scheme.
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sumptive hydroelectric scheme was economically justifiable, without the
multipurpose aspect it was not. In return for these concessions the U.S. was
to make the following payments:
Payment for Amount of Payment At Date of
Duncan Lake $ 12.0 millions Canadian 1 April 1968
High Arrow $ 56.3 millions Canadian 1 April 1969
Mica Creek $ 1.3 millions Canadian 1 April 1973
Downstream Entitlements $274.8 millions Canadian September 196467
Canada for its own part estimated that it would incur direct costs
amounting to $410.6 millions in order to realize its commitments. This was a
$66.2 million dollar excess of direct expenditures 68 over direct revenues,
assuming cost estimates accurate.
THE EMERGING LEGAL AMBIGUITY
The final settlement had important failings over and above the financial
aspects. These were basically twofold. In the first place the Treaty and 1964
Protocol did not create, or affirm, a 'rule of law' as to upstream, as opposed to
downstream, water rights. Rather the agreement deleted much of the effect
of the hitherto guiding principle of ARTICLE II of the Boundary Waters Treaty,
both by the failure to exercise the right to divert that it conferred and by not
clarifying the doctrine of prior appropriation as one limited in effect by
ARTICLE II to questions of damage compensation. In this regard ARTICLE
XVII of the Columbia River Treaty is of note. It consists of five sections
purporting to deal with the restoration of pre-Treaty legal status. The first
section provides that the "then existing international law" will apply to the
Columbia Basin water resources upon the Treaty's termination. Thus it is
made clear that, if the principle of ARTICLE II is pre-empted by way of a
conflicting 'rule of law' agreed to by the two nations, the latter will take
precedence. Section two provides that the Boundary Waters Treaty, at any
event, shall apply only to the extent that it does not conflict with any
provision of the Columbia River Treaty continuing in effect after termination.
Section three would appear to afford a more substantial guarantee of ARTICLE
II's applicability, for it provides that if the Boundary Waters Treaty is
abrogated per its ARTICLE XIV,69 the provisions of ARTICLE II shall remain
in force respecting the Columbia Basin. However this guarantee is heavily
qualified by sections four and five, the first of which provides that, in the
67 p. 138 The Columbia River Treaty, Protocol and Related Documents. Depart-
ment of External Affairs, Northern Affairs, and National Resources, Queen's Printers,Ottawa, February 1964. This capital was invested in the United States at a considerable
interest-earning disadvantage (i.e.: at 41/ %). See Financial Post article by Larratt
Higgins, May 25, 1966 at p. 25.
68 Nonetheless it was maintained, by convenience of a series of value projections
to 1973, that benefits would exceed costs by $53.4 millions. It was necessary to assume
that the U.S. payments were not committed elsewhere in order to achieve this remark-
able result.69 which requires one year's notice by either party.
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event that the Boundary Waters Treaty is abrogated, and Section 3 of
ARTICLE XVII is brought into force, one year's notice on either side will
cause ATRICLE II to also terminate. Section five allows the U.S. to remove
the force of ARTICLE II of the Boundary Waters Treaty if Canada should
divert for reasons other than the consumptive purposes provided for by
ARTICLE XIII of the Columbia River Treaty.
Section five is perhaps the most crucial provision of ARTICLE XVII for
it would appear to amount to a recognition that ARTICLE II is 'a created right'
instead of affirming a pre-existing one, by virtue of the fact that its effect is
subject to cancellation. 70 Therefore, to the degree that the Columbia River
Treaty is viable as a precedent in law, this redefinition of the status of ARTICLE
II has decapitated much of its force as a 'rule of law'.71 Yet it has been
argued72 that Section 12 of the Treaty's Protocol eliminates this difficulty.
Some doubt exists as to this contention.
"Canada and the United States of America are in agreement that the Treaty
does not establish any general principle or precedent applicable to waters other
than those of the Columbia River Basin and does not detract from the application
of the Boundary Waters Treaty 1909, to other waters."73
As can be noted, this section does not re-establish the Harmon doctrine.
Instead it merely states that the Columbia River Treaty shall have no effect
of itself upon the application of the Boundary Waters Treaty. But this is not
to say that the U.S. is bound to recognize ARTICLE II, for they can quite
properly argue that they did not consider it to be a 'rule of law' before the
signature of the Treaty.74 Additionally, the Protocol itself was ratified only
in Canada. The U.S. Senate did not ratify it, and for this reason it does not
have the force of law in the United States. In the extreme view it may
possibly not have force internationally so far as the U.S. is concerned.
The second major failing of the Treaty was that it did not account for the
consumptive value of the Basin's water resources. With growing urban and
industrial preclusion of existing U.S. fresh water supplies, clean water has
been assuming ever increasing value.75 On the Columbia the Americans have
constructed irrigation-dispersion facilities to make use of some of the
incremental water supply resulting from Canadian storages. Strong pressure
is being asserted by California to tranship a portion of this increment to the
drier states to the south, and thereby take full advantage of the added storage.
70 The Law Respecting International Rivers as Developed by Canada and the
United States: A Survey and Recent Developments, John Lorn McDougall, Osgoode
Hall Law School (unpublished).
71 p. 38 Hearing before The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
E.X.C. 87th Congress, First Session, March 8, 1961 (i.e.: for elaboration of U.S..view
as to treaty's effect upon Canada-U.S. trans boundary water law and Article II).
72 Supra Note 45.
73 The Columbia River Treaty and Related Agreements, supra note 67.
74 The U.S. pre-treaty arguments concerning the doctrine of prior appropriation
are consistent with this suggestion.
75 To illustrate this point, in 1964, Columbia water was valued at $39 per AF
when in the basin. Its total value was thus $7,200,000,000 a year. Considering that anAF of water can be as valuable as $300 in portions of California it can be seen that the
benefits of a U.S. extra basin transfer are enormous.
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It is suggested that, because vested interests are so immense 76 once water is
applied to consumptive uses, the doctrine of prior appropriation will be force-
fully applied so as to forever prevent consumptive diversions from the
Canadian section. In this regard it is of note that, per ARTICLE XIII of the
Columbia River Treaty, Canada is not given the paramount right to divert.
So too has the United States this same right. Thus it would seem that once
more it is a question of paramount right of ownership being vested in that
party first in time to develop. Given that the south west is an arid area, with
both a growing population and pollution problem, there can be little doubt
that it will be the United States who will be first to make consumptive
diversions.
This will be entirely to Canada's loss unless she can assert that,
because she is upstream owner, and as storage is provided on Canadian
territory, Canada is therefore first owner of the resource in a consumptive
sense (even if not in a hydroelectric sense) and that delivery of this same
water is a privilege for which some consideration proportionate to the value
conferred upon the U.S. should be tendered. This is by no means to suggest
that Canada should make such an assertion for the simple reason of making
the United States pay a higher price. Rather it is clear that at some point in
the future Canada will likely find that a large scale diversion out of the
Columbia basin is to her advantage. For this reason it is important that it be
established that the paramount property right of an upstream owner both still
applies and extends so as to include consumptive uses.
It is suggested that two beneficial aspects would result from the re-
establishment of such a principle. On the one hand will be created a 'rule of
law' that preserves the sovereignty of the upstream country vis-a-vis waters
occuring therein, as opposed to existing uncertainty arising from the Columbia
River Treaty. On the other hand it would definitively reject an interpretation
of the Treaty that has recently been given widespread publicity and support;
namely the principle of a 'continental resource heritage' that should be
allocated in terms of need alone without respect to the international frontier.
"More recently we have seen our common interest served in the Canadian-
United States Columbia River Treaty signed last year by President Johnson and
Prime Minister Pearson at the Peace Arch on the border between Washington
State and British Columbia. Even though there are still some problems to be
ironed out, the signing of the Treaty assures us that the water and energy resources
of Western Canada and Western United States will be utilized for all time to come
for the common good of both countries."77
The author to the above commentary, the Democratic Senator from the
State of Utah, Frank Moss, is of the opinion that the Columbia precedent
paves the way for a vast sharing of the continent's water resources. He has
advocated, with some official recognition,7s a scheme designated the North
76 Ibid.
77 The Congressional Record, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 21786-87, Senator
F. Moss, S. Utah. The emphasis is my own. •
78 A Senate select subcommittee was formed to study NAWAPA. See Western
Water Development; Special Subcommittee on Western Water Development of the Com-
mittee on Public Works, United States Senate, January 1966.
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American Water and Power Alliance which envisages a continental canal
scheme funneling water of Canadian origin to the U.S. 79 While Senator Moss
may represent the extreme interpretation of the Treaty, it is nonetheless one
that is popular and, to some extent, prima facie accurate as matters now
stand. It would appear Canada would be hard-pressed to find a principle of
law objecting to this interpretation. It is suggested a precedent that would
clarify the ambiguity of the Columbia River Treaty would be of enormous
worth. It is from this aspect that the Shuswap-Okanagan integration derives
most of its significance.
THE SHUSWAP, OKANAGAN, AND COLUMBIA:
RECOMMENDATIONS
If a Shuswap-Okanagan diversion occurs there is a risk of an inadvertent
international water transfer and all of the attendant problems being realized
regarding property right in the water increment and jurisdictional difficulties
over the Fraser Basin. If diversion does not occur, to the extent that fresh
water might stimulate economic activity, and aid in the elimination of lake
pollution, there will be a damaging effect upon the Okanagan region's future
growth potential. It is suggested that a means exists to solve not only both of
these difficulties but many of the ambiguities that are inherent in the
Columbia River Treaty in a single undertaking.
The Columbia River lies a short mountain range away from both the
Okanagan Valley and the Shuswap source waters (i.e., Mabel and Sugar
Lakes). On the western branch of the Columbia River two large storage
structures will ultimately be completed; one this year and another by 1973.
While much of the storage created by both structures has been appropriated
for hydroelectric generation under the downstream benefit sale agreement,
it is still possible for Canada to divert a substantial measure of this storage
for consumptive pul~poses. Possibly a large scale diversion may give rise to
U.S. damage claims regarding a loss in hydroelectric production, but there
is no provision in the Treaty that suggests that the interests of downstream
irrigators and power owner-producers are protected by a property sanction
paramount to Canada's right to effect consumptive diversions. Thus it is
recommended that the point of origin for any water supply increments for the
Okanagan be the mainstem Columbia itself.
There are a variety of ways by which this could be achieved both directly
from the Columbia to the Okanagan or via the Shuswap to the Okanagan.
It is this latter possibility which is perhaps the most attractive. One very
important feature is the fact that Shuswap Lake, at some time in the future,
would provide an ideal storage point for Columbia waters, allowing a large
scale Columbia-Fraser diversion. It was in fact this very proposal which was
79 See NA WAPA; North American Water and Power Alliance, Ralph M. Parsons
Co. N.Y., Los Angeles, Brochure 606-2934-19.
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the subject of the B.C. Engineering Company study of 1956.80 By virtue of
this study there is available much in the way of background as to a Columbia-
Shuswap diversion through the Eagle Pass. With little modification this
scheme could be altered to accommodate the instant proposal by way of
diverting into the northern inlet of Mabel Lake. Mabel Lake itself could then
be controlled by a regulation structure near the town of Hupel. By this means
the water requirements of the Okanagan could be satisfied without causing
a loss to the Fraser basin, and at the same moment would permit development
of the Shuswap River diversion as it has been studied.
A RE-ASSERTION OF ARTICLE II
Such a use of the Columbia water will have two immediate beneficial
effects towards the creation of an international 'rule of law'. It will first of all
establish beyond doubt that the prior appropriation of downstream U.S. power
development does not impinge on Canada's right to make consumptive
diversions but is limited in effect to questions of damage compensation as
provided by ARTICLE II. Secondly, it will pave the way for an assertion
that the upstream state has the right to divert for consumptive purposes
consistent with ARTICLE II of the Boundary Waters Treaty (and ARTICLE
XIII of the Columbia River Treaty), and will thus, as a precedent, support the
argument that ARTICLE II is still a rule of international law as between Canada
and the U.S. This result can be strengthened in the event that an additional
recommendation is appreciated; namely that Canada deliberately divert a
quantity of water greater than is, or will be, required by the Okanagan. This
proposal has two basic stems. First, Canada must recognize a doctrine that
in the past she rejected. Known as the Montana doctrine, this involved a U.S.
claim that the upstream source owner held beneficial title over those flows
occurring in the downstream state. At issue were the Waterton and Belly
Rivers, both of which originate in the U.S. Canada proposed to make use
of the entire flows of both rivers where they naturally flowed across the
frontier. In 1948 the U.S. requested a reference to check this act of
possession and asserted that the upstream state held a proprietary interest in
the water even after it left its jurisdiction. They therefore requested that a
quid pro quo return of one half the water thus coming to Canada be made to
the State of Montana in consideration for the passing of U.S. title to this water.
In effect this argument suggested that, although it was uneconomic for the
U.S. to affect a pre-emptive diversion of the Waterton and Belly Rivers this
still did not impinge upon their right of paramount title. At the time Canada
ignored this argument. However, it is now within her interest to accept it.
Once acknowledged Canada should re-invoke it with respect to the Columbia,
80 Unfortunately this study had a number of limitations. For example it assumed
entirely private development, and therefore higher taxation costs, that $308,000,000 in
fish ladders and related equipment would have to be provided on the Fraser, that none
of the ten structures would exceed 100 feet thus ensuring minimal scale power at low
efficiency, and a water service equivalent to 85,000 KW for the ladders during spawning
season. Unsurprisingly on this basis a Fraser diversion was unattractive.
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and in particular with respect to that water diverted into the Okanagan. Having
once asserted the right to divert, Canada is in a favourable bargaining position
to demand consideration for those flows redirected back into the Columbia
basin as respects their consumptive value. Acknowledgment by the U.S. in the
form of consideration will establish, as a concomitant result, that Canada
is first owner of waters occurring within its jurisdiction. This is the Harmon
doctrine. Its re-establishment will pave the way for later beneficial consump-
tive use of the Columbia and Kootenay headwaters as Canada requires them.
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION
It is further suggested that the immense importance of this scheme
safely brings it within the jurisdiction of the Federal government. In the
event that British Columbia will not sanction the proposal, s.92 ss.10 para-
graph (c) of the British North America Act should be exercised, by which
this scheme should be declared to the "General Advantage of Canada".
"92. In each Province the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation
to matters coming within the classes of subject next hereinafter enumerated;
that is to say, ... 10. Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are
of the following classes; . . . (c) Such Works as, although wholly situated
within the Province, are before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament
of Canada to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of
two or more of the Provinces."8s
In addition the Federal government may rely on sections (3) and (4)
of the International River Improvement Act.82
"3. The Governor in Council may for the purpose of developing and
utilizing the water resources of Canada in the national interest, make up
regulations.(a) respecting the construction, operation and maintenance of international river
improvements;
(b) respecting the issue, cancellation and suspension of licences for the con-
struction, operation and maintenance of international river improvements;(c) prescribing fees for licences issued under this Act; and(d) excepting any international river improvements from the operation of this
Act."
"4. No person shall construct, operate or maintain an international river
improvement unless he holds a valid licence therefor issued under this Act."83
Federal participation under these enactments is perhaps advisable. The
proposed diversion recommendations on the short term may appear to lack
justification from an economic point of view. The benefits of a clearer rule
of law are intangible, and it is possible that, for this reason, may be insufficient
justification to the Province. Nonetheless should the scheme permit beneficial
use of the Columbia basin resources in face of the Columbia River Treaty the
benefits are enormous and spread over four provinces (i.e., British Columbia,
81 s. 92 ss. 10 para. (c), A Consolidation of the British North American Acts 1867
to 1918, prepared by Elmer A. Driedger, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1967. The emphasis
is my own.
82 Statutes of Canada, 1955, Chapter 47.
83 Ibid.
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Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba) to which consumptive diversions would
be of benefit. In addition, in a policy sense, it allows greater certainty
through the elimination of the Columbia River Treaty ambiguities by
establishing a precedent that clearly reasserts ARTICLE II and the Harmon
doctrine to Canada's advantage. This it is contended will unequivocally
put an end to recent U.S. suggestions that Canada has recognized the
principle of 'continental water resources' that are the property of those in
greatest need, and in this sense will preserve Canada's sovereign right to
make independent use of all internally occuring water resources.

